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Agua Caliente REVISITED: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AS TO ZONING OF INDIAN RESERVATIONS
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.*
In an earlier article on the subject of zoning Indian reservations,'
this author began with quotes from a recent issue of Time magazine
that indicated two possibly overlapping problems: the legally unique
status of Indian reservations, sometimes largely independent of ex-
ternal political control, and the need for land-use planning at the
state, regional, and national levels. That those problems remain is
illustrated by statements in a recent National Geographic. In one
article, an American Indian speaks of problems of his people, and in
particular about the Navajos of the Four Comers area: "In recent
years an extensive coal-mining operation has mutilated some of their
most sacred land. A large power plant in that same region spews
contamination into the sky that is visible for many miles."2 Else-
where in the same issue, another writer speaks of trends as to land-
use controls and predicts, "I believe that by the year 20o the states
will have a significant voice in land-use policy-and they should. The
states will take back significant parts of the power they granted to
municipalities half a century ago."3
In the earlier article, I suggested that the states were also moving
into the area of imposing land-use controls on Indian reservations,
although I urged participation of, and consultation with, Indian
tribal governments in any such state activities. Since that was writ-
ten, my view has been challenged 4 additional writing has appeared
on this subject; and several cases have been decided that relate either
directly or indirectly to zoning on reservations. This article will con-
sider these recent developments.
The basic legal and political status of Indian reservations has, of
course, not changed in the past few years. It remains true that the
reservations vary considerably in historical background, present form
of government, and relation to other governments.5 Early United
States legal authority treated the Indian tribes as independent sov-
ereign entities, relying on the federal government for external pro-
tection but retaining their right of self-government. The tribes thus
had the unusual distinction of being sovereigns within a sovereign.
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It has recently been observed that the law on Indian status "has
developed primarily in response to existing power relationships be-
tween the federal and state governments and the Indian"8 with little
consideration of United States constitutional doctrines. Increasingly
there has been a tendency "to avoid reliance on platonic notions of
Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and
statutes.... ." The same writer has commented that to the extent
that constitutional law has affected Indian affairs, those affairs have
been treated as external, rather than internal, concerns of the na-
tional government, and the power over such matters may be con-
sidered an attribute of national sovereignty. 10
We must begin with the premise that only federal and tribal gov-
ernments have legal control over Indian reservations and that state
jurisdiction, and extension of any state law, to the reservation can
occur only as specifically authorized by the federal government."
As another commentator recently observed, "[T]he combined
plenary powers of the federal government and the powers of internal
sovereignty of the tribes operate to preclude state jurisdiction in
Indian affairs absent specific congressional grant of such jurisdic-
tion."' 2 Such specific grants to the states have sometimes taken the
form of termination of an Indian reservation and the conferring of
post-termination jurisdiction on the state government.', But legis-
lation in 1953, the much-discussed Public Law 28o, granted several
states jurisdiction over persons and property within reservations that
continued to exist within the boundaries of those states, and gave
all other states the option of asserting such jurisdiction.'" Amend-
ments to this legislation in 1968 rendered all future assertions of
state jurisdiction under the Act subject to consent of the affected
Indians, and allowed the states to return to the federal government
jurisdiction they had once assumed.' 5 Public Law 28o contains a
number of exceptions designed to protect Indian tribes against un-
due state interference with their internal concerns, and contains the
general provision that tribal ordinances not inconsistent with state
law will remain in effect even after assumption of state jurisdiction.' 0
Although Public Law 280 is often treated as an outgrowth of the
now considerably repudiated policy of "termination" of Indian res-
ervations, a recent case points out that this statute is only one part of
a "more gradual process" than immediate termination. To a large
extent, the law continued federal control, "awaiting the decision by
Congress, on a case-by-case basis, that termination of a particular
tribe, with consequent imposition of all aspects of state jurisdiction,
was appropriate."' 8
The result of all this was what some consider "over-regulation" of
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the Indians by too many different authorities, and a too-great de-
pendence of the Indians on the law in general and on congressional
enactments in particular.19 The system has grown up between ex-
tremes of exploitation of the Indians on the one hand, and a genuine
(although some now believe unnecessary) desire to protect the In-
dians on the other. As applied to the Indians' use of land, the system
has reflected the concept of aboriginal title, under which it is con-
sidered that the Indians have rights based on early possession and
amounting to a usufruct in the soil (that is, rights of occupancy and
use), but title is in the conqueror.20 Since the federal government
now represents the conquering whites and holds a kind of reversion-
ary interest, while the Indians have the right of use, this again leaves
the state with no control unless granted it by one of the two owners.
While traditionally the Indians' rights of use were considered de-
feasible at the whim of the federal government, compensation has
in some recent situations been held necessary for governmental
takings of Indian lands where congressional recognition of the In-
dian rights could be found.21 Ultimately, most authorities would
agree that control over the land within Indian reservations must be
traced back to Congress, and federal regulations validly issued under
congressional authorization will thus prevail over state laws.22
What is now the status of Indian tribal governments? It was
noted in my earlier article that at least three different views had
been taken: that the Indian government has sovereignty over the
reservation; that the tribal government's powers are analogous to
those of a municipality; and that the tribe merely has rights com-
parable to any landowner's. 3 This last view has now clearly been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in a case holding that
power to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian coun-
try could be validly delegated to a tribal council. 24 Stating that the
tribes are not merely private organizations but have attributes of
sovereignty,25 the Court ruled that the lower tribunal's contrary
holding took an unduly restrictive view of tribal powers. Another
recent case,26 in dealing with a state (Montana) that has not as-
sumed jurisdiction under Public Law 28o, ruled that state court
jurisdiction would interfere with tribal powers of self-government
and would thus be invalid as extended to adoption of a child where
all parties were residents of the reservation. These decisions indi-
cate a kind of quasi-sovereignty of the tribes, at least as to internal
concerns. However, the analogy to municipalities also is still made,
especially when typical activities of the tribal government are dis-
cussed. There is difficulty in classifying an entity that within the
common law system is a unique hybrid. It might best be considered
251
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a special type of "community," 2 often predating even the federal
government and retaining residual powers.20
More important than the question of classification is the relation-
ship of the tribal government to the government of the state in which
the reservation is located. An important recent development in this
area has been the ruling that even those states asserting jurisdiction
under Public Law 28o may not tax reservation Indians. 0 This result
is considered desirable as protecting Indian resources from depletion
by state taxation, limiting Public Law 28o to bringing "law and
order" to the reservations, and preventing further overregulation of
the Indians by different governments."' The holding is supported by
the general rule that, absent specific congressional authorization, the
state cannot infringe on the Indians' right of self-government, either
by exercise of state-court jurisdiction82 or extension of state law.8"
And Public Law 28o does not specifically authorize such taxation,
whatever arguments may be waged over whether the exceptions to
state jurisdiction clearly cover all taxation. Furthermore, most state
taxation could be found to infringe on areas either fully occupied
by congressional legislation 4 or at least covered extensively by fed-
eral policies. 5 The freedom from state jurisdiction and control has
not clearly been removed, and thus the general rule of immunity
must apply." It is possible to argue that because tax laws are often
enforced by criminal sanctions, an assumption of state criminal juris-
diction under Public Law z8o encompasses application of state
taxes.3 7 But, particularly where taxation of on-reservation Indian
property or of income earned on the reservation by an Indian is con-
cerned, state taxation has normally been treated as too great an inter-
ference with tribal rights .3
Even the exclusion of state taxes from the reservation, however,
is not complete. It also has recently been held that while the state
may not impose a sales tax on a reservation sale from one Indian to
another, it may require an Indian retailer on the reservation to col-
lect the tax on sales made to non-Indians.30 Thus, it is seen again
that there is an element of flexibility, even of compromise, in the
decisions. Non-Indians should not be allowed to escape their obli-
gations, such as paying taxes to the state or obeying its fish and game
laws, 40 simply by going onto reservation land to make a purchase or
transact other business. A similar attitude is seen in the ruling that
reservation Indians, despite their being governed by tribal and
United States authorities, are also, politically, residents of the state
in which they live, and thus are entitled to vote for state officials.41
To some extent, reservations are thus recognized as part of the state
in which located.
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Recent governmental programs sometimes change the interrela-
tionship of state governments to Indian lands. It has been observed
that Indian lands, and others under some degree of federal control,
are both benefit and burden to the state.42 The amount of Indian
and public domain land within a state is, for instance, one factor in
determining that state's allocation of federal-aid highway funds.43
But state laws ordinarily have no application to Indians living on
tribal land, or on lands within the reservation allotted to them but
held in trust for them by the United States.44 The chief exception
is the situation where a state has acquired jurisdiction under the
aforementioned Public Law 280. Even here, there may be problems
of enforcement by state courts of judgments obtained against In-
dians, although it has been noted that such problems are perhaps no
greater than others (such as enforcement in one state of a judgment
obtained in a sister state) inherent in our federal system. 45 As a
further limitation on the effect of Public Law z8o, it is also true that
due to added costs that would be involved, Indian opposition, or
other factors, a number of states have so far made no attempt to
utilize Public Law z8o and thus acquire jurisdiction over Indian
reservations.46
Nonetheless, the sweep of Public Law 28o is sufficiently broad
where it is utilized. The Public Law and several Supreme Court
cases have led one commentator to conclude, "Today states may
assert authority over Indian tribes in the absence of a Congressional
prohibition, provided that there is no interference with a recognized
right of self-government or the exercise of federal authority. 4 r Al-
though this statement was made in broad terms, it would seem valid
only where Public Law 28o, or some other congressional conferring
of jurisdiction on a state, applies. Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that where a tribal council purported to grant concurrent jurisdic-
tion to tribal and state courts over certain matters, the grant to the
state was invalid; because there had been no vote of the tribe and no
legislative action by the state, the requirements of Public Law 28o
were not met.48 While this decision was limited to jurisdiction of
state courts, the rationale would seem applicable to the imposition
of any state laws.49
Where Public Law 28o has been utilized to give jurisdiction to
state courts and to extend state laws, the cases indicate that a state
statute may then be presumed applicable until it is shown to inter-
fere with the Indian right of self-government.50 What matters are
still covered by this right? Some classifications seem clear. Transac-
tions involving Indian lands and suits by Indians against Indians
are usually considered such.5' Membership in a tribe, and the right to
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share in a tribal land base, seem to fit into this category."2 In the
criminal area, extradition powers may be such." On the other hand,
as specifically mentioned by statute, sanitation and quarantine laws
of the state can apply to Indian land.54 Even without Public Law
z8o, it has been found that Indian rights are not interfered with by
state jurisdiction of non-Indians who commit crimes against each
other on the reservation, or of Indians off the reservation who violate
statelaws. 55
The Supreme Court has said that even provision for "absolute
federal jurisdiction" does not necessarily mean exclusive federal juris-
diction or preclude the exercise of some residual state authority. 0
Thus, such residual state power may exist wherever there is no in-
fringement of the Indian right of self-government. 7 But this seems
a considerable extension of broad Court language and in conflict
with the principle of not inferring state jurisdiction unless clearly
granted. The safer statement would limit the test of noninterference
with tribal powers to situations where, under Public Law 280, state
jurisdiction exists if no such interference is found. Thus, one recent
observer has urged that Public Law z8o be clearly recognized as the
exclusive method by which a state can acquire jurisdiction over In-
dian reservations. 58 This would reduce the amount of ad hoc deter-
mination of state jurisdiction, would increase certainty in this area,
and would follow logically from Congress having provided, in Public
Law 280, a specific procedure for states to follow. 9
What, then, is the current status of possible application of state
land-use controls to Indian reservations? The several cases in federal
district courts that allowed such controls to be applied to reserva-
tions by state and local governments have not fared well. The Agua
Caliente opinion, discussed in my earlier article,60 was vacated in an
unpublished order.61 Where a lower court had held a county gam-
bling ordinance applicable to a reservation, 62 the appellate court
ruled that the merits should not be reached because no "case or
controversy," in the federal constitutional and statutory sense, ex-
isted. 3 The same appellate court in the same opinion found that
an action involving a county building code was moot,0 4 and that no
federal jurisdiction existed in a case concerning possible application
of a county ordinance on outdoor festivals. 5 This activity all took
place in the Ninth Circuit, but a case in the Tenth Circuit met a
similar fate. Interestingly, the lower court had there ruled that, even
though the state (New Mexico) had not assumed jurisdiction under
Public Law 28o, the state, in the absence of federal preemption,
could apply to an Indian reservation state laws on subdivision con-
trol, construction licensing, and water quality, because these would
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not interfere with tribal self-government. 6 It was reasoned that Pub-
lic Law 28o did not oust the states of preexisting jurisdiction. But,
since all activities of the project in question were in limbo because
of an injunction enjoining further action until there was compliance
with the National Environmental Protection Act, no present case or
controversy justifying a court decision could be found by the higher
court. 7 These decisions certainly did not, however, indicate that the
lower courts had ruled incorrectly on the merits of the cases, only
that they should not have reached the merits. And one Ninth Cir-
cuit opinion said that Congress "may" have intended to grant states
the power under Public Law 280 to impose zoning and other land-
use controls on reservation land.68
Then came the Santa Rosa case,69 in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled that Congress in passing Public Law 28o did not intend an
"immediate transfer to local governments" 70 of civil regulatory pow-
er, and thus that a county zoning ordinance or building code could
not apply to reservation land. This obviously leaves the door open
for argument that eventually such a transfer might be found, even
possibly without the passage of further legislation, and for argument
that state-wide planning or land-use laws might be applied to a res-
ervation. Further, the appellate court reversed the portion of the
lower court order that would have prevented enforcement of any
county ordinance that would have increased the expense or incon-
venience of maintaining federally funded housing facilities.71 The
higher court noted that this might be used to prevent the county
from charging Indian residents of such facilities the same amount
charged other county residents for water and for sanitation hook-ups;
not "all incidental on-reservation consequences of County regula-
tions" are invalid.72 So again a note of ad hoc determination is
sounded.
Some support for the Santa Rosa ruling may be found in the lan-
guage of Public Law 28o excepting from state power any "encum-
brance" on Indian land,7 in the holding that municipalities cannot
annex reservation land without consent of Congress,74 and in the
cases ruling that the state cannot tax individual Indian income
earned on a reservation.75 Statutory patterns indicate that Congress
has continued to respect strong Indian rights to control development
of their reservation lands. 76
But recent statutes also indicate a concern that Indians, in de-
veloping their lands, take into account the relationship of those areas
to neighboring lands.7 7 Where tribal consent has been given (as is
now necessary to new acquisition of state jurisdiction under Public
Law 28o), it has long been undoubted that state school attendance,
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quarantine, and sanitation laws may apply.1 It is arguable that we
are arriving at the time when land-use controls are as essential to
the health and well-being of a whole state or region as the sanitation
and similar laws have been in the past. One commentator poses the
questions: "Why should Indian lands in or near urban growth
centers be free of local zoning and subdivision controls, as long as
those controls are applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion? Should
we assume that local public officials will generally disregard or be
unaware of Indian values and interests?"7 As to the second question,
the history of treatment of the Indians by state and local govern-
ments can no doubt be used to produce many arguments on each
side. But it is submitted that the first question is not satisfactorily
answered by the Santa Rosa case, and that it cannot be satisfac-
torily answered by simply saying, "There is no jurisdiction."
The traditional pattern of excluding state control from the res-
ervation has been noted as a hindrance to overall planning.80 What
legal authorities support state land-use powers under Public Law
280? In a case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, two
dissenting justices pointed to the importance of protecting state anti-
pollution plans from frustration by the exclusion of Indian lands.,'
More recently, interpreting another statute, 2 the Court ruled that
federal reserved water rights held on behalf of Indians could be de-
termined in state courts.8 3 The federal government's consent to state
jurisdiction was said not to imperil the United States' special obli-
gation to protect Indians, since "The Government has not abdicated
any responsibility fully to defend Indian rights in state court, and
Indian interests may be satisfactorily protected under regimes of
state law."" It is submitted that if the federal statutory authority
were found, the same comment might be made as to state court
jurisdiction, and state application of laws, in land-use controls.
Otherwise, reservation land may be free of application of state
policies designed to preserve the environment, and contrary rules
could defeat these policies.8 5 Politically and governmentally, the
reservations have been said to be part of the state;" and politically
and governmentally, one of the most important tasks now facing the
states is planning land use for metropolitan areas and other regions.87
Planning, of any sort, to be effective must be comprehensive and
must not mirror solely the needs and interests of some elements in
society."8
Reflecting recognition of the need for state control, Arizona in
1967 accepted jurisdiction of Indian reservations under Public Law
28o with respect to air and water pollution laws. 0 Whether such a
limited acceptance is valid under the statutes can certainly be ques-
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tioned,90 but the need for uniform state policies and enforcement is
real. The Supreme Court, in a case involving off-reservation treaty
rights, recognized the state's need to apply uniform measures to con-
serve fish resources. 9 The reservations of today are often not the
relatively isolated communities of the past, but are linked with
neighboring communities by roads, utility networks, etc 2 Environ-
mental problems travel those roads and networks and do not stop
at boundaries of reservations, just as they do not stop at municipal
borders.93
Environmental problems are not the only ones, of course, that
cross boundaries. Concern has also been expressed recently over
reservation activities that might amount to violations of state liquor
or gambling laws-if those laws were applicable.94 Some of the con-
cern may be unnecessary as federal laws often prohibit such activities
on reservations.95 But jurisdictional problems also are posed for local
law enforcement officials where off-reservation criminal suspects
seek refuge on the reservation.96 Cooperative efforts of the various
governments, on and off the reservation, and clarification of the
jurisdiction of tribal courts may alleviate these difficulties; 7 and, as
has been noted, Public Law 280, where its requirements are met,
clearly gives criminal jurisdiction to the states.
What, then, could be solutions for the question of state power
under this law as to land-use control? One proposal is that we might
try to balance the Indians' interest in free use of their lands with the
states' interests in protecting vital interests of citizens living off the
reservation.98 Thus, it is suggested, state laws designed to prevent
brush fires could be applied to the reservation, while a state building
code could not, except as extended to buildings advertised for sale
to non-Indians. 99 This is in line with the policy of not allowing un-
due infringement on tribal self-government. It obviously involves
considerable indefiniteness of result, but the courts seem to favor a
case-by-case approach to these problems, with only the broadest of
guidelines. It would not bring an easy solution to the questions in-
volving zoning laws. Water resources might well be considered vital
to off-reservation citizens, and the fight against pollution could be
considered a vital concern; is use of land yet considered that vital a
matter, of sufficient concern to off-reservation persons? It at least
may be becoming such.
A simpler test, although one perhaps requiring federal legislation,
would allow state laws to apply as to land use only if tribal govern-
ments did not create regulations and methods of enforcement meet-
ing certain standards. It has been predicted that, "If the states as-
sume more and more jurisdiction over Indian affairs, as seems likely,
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the Indian courts seem destined to lose jurisdiction correspondingly
except over purely tribal affairs."'100 And it has been said that "few
tribes have planning capability."''1 But this is not necessarily so.
The erosion of tribal power need not occur if the tribes act in the
land-use area.10 2 Although the structures of tribal governments vary
greatly, many do have the basic organization and machinery for such
regulation.0 3 The approach to regulation of use may sometimes be
different from that in white society, 0 4 but some tribes are recog-
nizing the need for restrictions and are preparing codes accord-
ingly.10 5
Federal legislation to assure the states of zoning power over the
reservations is, of course, another possible answer.100 This would
undoubtedly encounter opposition as infringing on tribal govern-
ments and changing the existing relationship among the powers that
govern reservations. Less extreme, as far as changing these relation-
ships is concerned, would be the passage of national land-use.plan-
ning legislation, such as has been proposed in recent years.'07 Since
no one denies that the reservations are subject to federal law, any
restrictions in such legislation could apply to the reservations. But
these proposals have met with strong opposition as interfering with
the rights of the states, and the legislation, if ever passed, may be
limited to vague guidelines that still call on the states for definite
formulation and implementation. Nonetheless, there is increasing
recognition of the need for some national land-use planning poli-
cies,10 8 which could help in the solution of reservation problems. It
has even been observed that our cities might now be more efficiently
treated as directly affiliated with the federal government, rather than
under the control of the state. 10 While such a policy would be a
radical change as to cities, as applied to reservations it would be the
traditional rule.
At another extreme, it is possible to argue for abolition of the spe-
cial federal relationship toward the Indians and the reservations. It
has been said that the traditional structure of governance by tribe
and the United States is based on the Indian's nonparticipation in
state affairs and in our constitutional system in general." 0 From this
it can be reasoned that now the Indian, being a full-fledged citizen,
should be treated the same as other persons, under state law and
otherwise."' But this is basically the "termination" policy that
would end the reservations and ignore and endanger the Indian ways
of life."12
A final, and perhaps better, answer lies in cooperation between
tribal and other governments. Inter-local cooperation has been called
an unused resource at our command,"" and such cooperation is
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available to tribes as well as cities, counties, and other units. It has,
for instance, been suggested that where a non-Indian community
grows on or near Indian land, there is an opportunity for both parts
of the community to work toward solving mutual problems-to
create planned communities, and to let each society learn from the
other, while still allowing the Indians to retain their traditional
stronghold. 14 Metropolitan governments are much proposed and
sometimes created for today's urban areas," 8 and it has been sug-
gested that even these may soon be outdated by increased need for
regional planning.110 The old concept of home-rule as an ideal for
the city or for any relatively small area is increasingly challenged as
unsuited to efficiency and the present need for regional services. 1 7
Even in the disposition of United States public lands, it is being
recognized that the needs for comprehensive planning and zoning
regulations must be satisfied before the land can be transferred.","
As with any proposals for a changed relationship between the
reservation and the federal government, creation of a true metro-
politan or regional government with control over Indian land would
have to comply with appropriate federal legislation. Suggestions for
cooperation on a more informal basis between existing tribal and
local governments, and the establishment of planning activities
within the tribes, can, however, clearly be accomplished under exist-
inglaw.
This article has reviewed some current developments relating to
state power as to Indian lands, and application of land-use controls
to such land. It is submitted that the basic laws and underlying
problems remain much the same as stated previously. The question
of whether Public Law 28o will be found to give states and localities
eventual powers to zone reservation land has not been finally an-
swered. Even if state power exists under such legislation, there
remains the need for cooperation with tribal authorities. If no such
power exists, the need for tribal exercise of land controls is all the
greater. It is suggested that the answer to zoning of reservations does
not lie in mere assertion of lack of state power, although neither does
it lie exclusively in the recognition of such power. It may lie in some
of the proposals mentioned herein.
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